Buying Back the Land by Barnes, Peter
-146-
Buying Back the Land 
A Proposal for California 
by PETER BARNES 
An idea for a land trust fund, which may be relevant to other states as well. 
The land problem in California; as elsewhere in 
America, is both environmental and economic. 
Open space in urban and suburban areas is fast 
disappearing. The last major open space area in the 
Los Angeles basin-the Santa Monica Mourltaihs-is 
threatened with imminent development .. The San 
Francisco Bay area is in better shape, but developers 
have marked large chunks of Marin, San Mateo, Santa 
·Clara, Alameda, and Contra Costa counties for sub-
division. 
As the cities lose breathing space, people flee to 
the countryside for relief. But the unspoiled wilder-
ness is also vanishing. Over half a million acres of 
California's mountain and desert land have been 
committed to second-home subdivisions within the 
past decade. Farmland is being gobbled up at the rate 
of 134,000.acres per year. And the oases set aside by 
the government for parks are being crowded to the 
bursting point. The larger state parks now require 
reservations weeks in advance. During 1968 and 
1969, over 360,000 people were turned away from 
state parks and beaches. Public parks are getting so 
crowded that a San Diego syndicate is buying land for 
private parks and selling memberships for $1,800 
down plus $96 a year. 
Degradation of farmland is also part of the prob-
lem. Intensively irrigated areas of the Imperial and 
Coachella valleys are becoming so saline thai they 
may soon be impossible to farm. Oil the west side of 
the San Joaquin Valley, the "mining" of underground 
water by large corporate farms has caused the land to 
subside by several dozen feet. Giant corp~rate and 
tax-loss feedlots are beginning to create substantial 
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waste disposal problems in many parts of the state. 
Perhaps the most serious threat to man and nature 
comes from a vicious ecological circle of toxic chem-
icals. Extensiv~ use of single-crop c.ultivation, pesti-
cides, and inorganic fertilizers depletes the soil and 
increases the variety and resistance of pests. To 
ove~come these problems large absentee-owned farms 
pour even mote chemicals onto the land. This leads to 
further depletion, more pests, and more chemicals. 
Small resident farmers, while often trapped on the 
same chemical treadmill, ate more inclined to hus-
band their land. They live. and work on it, may want 
to pass it on to their children, and can't afford to 
pour vast su.ms into the pockets of oil and chemical 
companies. 1 
The concentration of land in a few hands also 
creates human problems. Since the day in 1848 when 
gold was discovered in the Sierra Nevada foothills, 
California land has been a monumental source of 
wealth. This wealth comes from assets that once were 
publicly owned but are now controlled by a relative 
few: the land itself, minerals such as gold and petro-
leum, surface and underground water (geothermal 
steam), and timber. The story of how these assets 
passed from public to concentrated private ownership 
has been related elsewhere. 2 Today a few dozen 
families and corporations-mostly railroads, energy · 
companies, timber companies, and corporate farms-
control the state's land and r~sources in a way that 
can only be described as feudal. The recent Nader 
task force that investigated California land ownership 
found that the ten largest landowners in the state 
own more than 12 percent of the privately held land 
(Table 1 ). On a county-by-county basis, the Nader 
team found that ·the top 20 landowners in rural 
counties (i.e., a fraction of 1 percent of the popula-
tion) generally own 25 to 50 percent of the land. 
Even in a compact urban county such as San Fran-
cisco, the ten biggest real estate owners (.0013 per-
cent of the population) own about 8 percent of the 
assessed valuation. And the trend toward concentra-
tion continues. 3 
TABLE 1: The Top Ten 
Corporation 
Southern Pacific Co. 
Newhall Land Co. 
Shasta Forest Co. 
Tenneco 
Tejon Ranch 
Standard Oil of Calif. 
Boise-Cascade 
Georgia-Pacific 
Acres Owned in California 
2,400,000 
1,600,000 
479,000 
363,000 
348,000 
306,000 
303,000 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 
Occidental Petroleum 
Total 
278,000 
250,000 
200,000 
6,527,000 
51,200,000 Total Private Land 
The principal victims of this concentration of 
landed wealth are the rural and urban poor. Working 
family farmers are steadily being driven off the land 
by large corporations and tax-loss syndicates. In 1950 
there were 137,000 farms in California, mostly under 
250 acres. In 1969 there were only 77,875, a drop of 
44 percent in 20 years. Landless farmworkers-89 
percent of whom are employed by the top echelon of 
commercial farms· (sales of $40,000 and up)-are 
among the lowest paid workers in America. They too 
are steadily being displaced from the land by expen-
sive new harvesting machines developed by the Uni-
versity of California for the state's corporate farms. 
In many parts of the Central Valley, small towns are 
literally dying. 
The exodus from rural California intensifies the 
plight of the urban poor as well as that of the 
working and middle-class taxpayer. The job and 
housing markets stay tight, and welfare rolls increase. 
As poor people co'ngregate in cities and suburbs, land 
values rise, in turn driving up the cost of housing. 
James Davis, vice-president of the Real Estate Re-
search Council of Northern California, calculates that, 
on the average, land acquisition costs account for 27 
percent of the total cost of new single-family houses 
in San Francisco (and a slightly lower percentage in 
the suburbs). Elliott Maltzman, a Los Angeles de-
veloper who tried building· federally subsidized single-
family houses for less than $24,000, found that "with 
today's land costs and the costs of quality materials, 
, you could produce nothing but instant slums."4 
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Buy Back California 
What can be done to protect and share California's 
land? 
Environmentalists have approached the problem in 
three ways. They've pushed for lower taxes on un-
developed land, higher appropriations for open space 
acquisition, and adoption of land-use plans and reg-
ulations. All three approaches have serious limita-
tions. 
The first led to passage in 1965 of the California 
Land Conservation Act, more commonly known as 
the Williamson Act, which permits assessment of 
undeveloped rural land at use value rather than at 
market value. The act has given million-dollar prop-
erty tax breaks to large landowners but has done little 
to deter development. A study by the State Board of 
Equalization in 1972 found that more than 25 per-
cent of the land assessed in accordance with the 
Williamson Act is owned by 12 large corporations. 
Together these corporations enjoyed reduced prop-
erty tax assessments of more than $44 million. All are 
actively involved in the development game. 
· The second approach-public acquisition of open 
space-has reached a fiscal dead end. The legislature's 
Joint Committee on Open Space Lands reported that 
the cost of purchasing imperiled open space land that 
cannot effectively be protected through zoning is 
about $4 billion at 1970 prices. Given the competing 
demands on existing state and federal revenue 
sources, it is highly unlikely that anything near that 
amount will be allocated to open space acquisition. 
The Nixon administration is already cutting back the 
miniscule (approximately $100 million in 1972) fed-
eral Land and Water Conservation Fund, as well as 
the urban open space program. 
The third approach-land-use planning and regula-
tion-is limited by the fact that landowners have 
considerably more clout with planning departments 
and zoning boards than do environmentalists. More-
over, a landowner or developer has the advantage of 
staying power: he may lose a variance appeal two or 
three times, but sooner or later the zoning board will 
change and he'll win. The creation earlier this year of 
regional zoning commissions for the California coast-
line was hailed as a great environmental victory, but it 
already appears that a substantial number of commis-
sioners are hostile to the environmental viewpoint. 
Limited as the approaches of environmentalists to 
the land problem are, they are well ahead of the 
approaches thus far developed by low-income groups. 
Generally such groups have confined themselves to 
seeking small parcels of surplus federal land, or filing 
lawsuits to compel enforcement of decades-old laws 
and treaties. Thus, the Pit River Indians have sought 
the return of land they assert is theirs under a 
nineteenth-century treaty; landless farmworkers in 
the Imperial Valley have sued to compel enforcement 
of the 160-acre limitation and residency requirement 
of the 1902 Reclamation Act; a coalition of migrant 
farmworkers is seeking enforcement of the 1864 act 
granting land to the Southern Pacific railroad on the 
condition that it sell the land to settlers at no more 
than $1.25 per acre. None of these legal efforts has 
much prospect of success. Nor is there much hope 
among low-income groups that the land problem can 
ever be resolved in a manner beneficial to them. The 
history of government land giveaways-from the . 
railroad grants of the 1860s to the urban renewal 
write-downs of the 1960s-is too one-sided to offer 
much encouragement. 
Yet it is just 'within the realm of possibility that 
low-income groups, by joining with environmental-
ists, labor; and other progressive forces, could bring 
about a favorable distribution of land ownership in 
California. The mechanism for doing this could be a 
state government trust fund which, for purposes of 
public salability, might be called the California Land 
Conservation Fund (CLCF). The CLCF would make 
land acquisition funds available to public agencies and · 
others for uses consistent with environmental protec-
tion and economic justice. It would do so without 
imposing new levies on most taxpayers. It would thus 
be a much stronger political device than presently is 
available for land acquiSition and control. With 
relatively minor modifications, the CLCF model-
described below-could also be adopted in other 
states, or at the federal level. 
The operating premise of the CLCF is that land 
and resource redistribution can be a means to several 
ends, the principal ones being greater economic 
opportunity for low-income families, a more decen-
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tralized ·econom)( in which the role of absentee 
corporations is diminished while that of locally 
owned enterprises is increased, preservation of open 
space, and better care of the land. The CLCF itself 
would not own or zone land, operate farms, or set up 
local enterprises. These functions would be filled by 
other public and private institutions, some of which 
already exist, many of which still need to be built. 
The CLCF would be a politically salable transfer 
mechanism that would make financially possible the 
objectives cited above. It would provide only one of 
the many ing(edients (albeit an extremely important 
one) needed for economic and environmental change: 
large and steady inputs of money for land purchase. 
Its uniqueness is that it would do so in a way not 
dependent ~pon the diminishing willingness of the 
legislature (or Congress) to tax the working and 
middle classes for the benefit of the poor. 
Here's how the CLCF would work. Like the 
highway, social security, and other existing trust 
funds, the CLCF would be a separate government 
account into which money would pour from special 
taxes-in this case, taxes that fall not on the average 
taxpayer but on the wealthy few who profit most 
handspmely from land and resources. Revenues from 
these taxes would be allocated for carefully specified 
purposes and to particular recipients: half would go 
to cities, towns, counties, arid regional park districts 
for the purchase of open space land, while the 
remainder would be granted to low-income coopera-
tives,-community development corporations (CDCs), 
public utility districts, and nonprofit land trusts for 
the purchase of productive land. Like the other trust 
funds, the CLCF, once established (and especially if 
established by a ballot initiative) would be self-
perpetuating and relatively immune to political 
sabotage. 
Funding the CLCF 
The principal taxes feeding the CLCF would be a 
severance tax on the extraction of oil, gas, other 
minerals, and timber, and a tax on the unearned 
increment in land value. The severance tax is a 
well-known tax applied in many mineral-rich states, 
including Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Alaska. 
The unearned increment tax is a kind of capital gains 
tax applied to land. It has been used in England, 
South Africa, Australia, Denmark, and other coun-
tries, though never in the United States. Its name 
derives from what John Stuart Mill called the 
"unearned increment" -the rise in land value brought 
about by public expenditures (highways, sewers, 
irrigation projects, etc.) and by economic and 
population growth. Capturing the unearned incre-
ment for private gain is what land speculation is all 
about. Recapturing it for the public good is the 
objective of an unearned increment tax. 5 
A state severance tax would fall most heavily on 
the holders of working interests in oil, natural gas, 
cement, sand and gravel, other mineral properties, 
and timber-i.e., the major oil, timber, and land-
owning companies. Since these companies benefit 
from a wide variety of federal and state tax 
preferences-and since the resources they extract are 
a gift of nature to all, not to just a privileged few-a 
severance tax is a highly'\ppropriate levy. From an 
environmental standpoint, the severance tax is an 
excellent one because, unlike the ad valorem property 
tax, it encourages conservation rather than depletion 
of resources. For added effect a differentially high 
rate might be applied to the severance of resources 
(such as virgin redwoods) deemed particularly worthy 
of conservation. A basic rate of 7 percent would yield 
approximately $150 million annually. 
To some extent a severance tax could be passed on 
by oil, cement, and timber companies to consumers 
in the form of higher prices. However, since 
California companies would be competing against 
out-of-state producers who would not be affected by 
the tax, it is doubtful that a significant portion of the 
tax could be shifted. 
The unearned increment tax, if universally applied, 
would be borne by all owners of land that is 
appreciating in value. It would be politically wise, 
however, to exempt land immediately related to most 
residential property, small farms, and small busi-
nesses. The tax would then be borne almost entirely 
by large landowning corporations and real estate 
speculators. Its impact would be greatest on large 
owners of urban and urban fringe land. 
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In practice, an unearned increment tax could take 
a variety of forms. The National Commission on 
Urban Problems, chaired by former Senator Paul 
Douglas, described several, ranging from a total shift 
to site value taxation to a transaction tax on land 
value increments. I favor tacking on an annual land 
gains tax to the state income tax. This would be 
similar to the ordinary capital gains tax except that it 
would be payable while gains accrue, rather than at 
time of realization-a necessary difference since one 
objective of the tax is to induce large absentee 
landowners to sell. 
Collection of an annual land gains tax would be 
relatively simple. Local assessors, when mailing out 
their annual property tax bills, would make two extra 
carbon copies; one would be mailed to the property 
owner, the other to the State Franchise Tax Board 
for verification purposes. Each nonexempt property 
owner would then submit a self-declaratory land gains 
schedule along with his state income tax return. He 
would attach to this schedule copies of all appro-
priate tax bills, much as employers' W-2 forms are 
attached to the regular income tax form. His tax 
liability would be calculated in the following fashion: 
from the total asses:;ed value of his nonexempt 
California real estate as of a given date in the current 
year he would subtract the total assessed value of his 
nonexempt California real estate as of the same date 
in the preceding year. The difference, representing 
the total gain in assessed value of land and 
improvements, would be multiplied by four to obtain 
the total gain in fair market value (assessed valuation 
in California is set by law at 25 percent of fair market 
value). Then the property owner would subtract the 
amount expended on capital improvements during 
the preceding year, and add the depreciation (if any) 
claimed elsewhere in his return. This would yield the 
land value increment for the previous year-i.e., the 
increase in value not attributable to the owner's own 
improvements-which would then be taxed at an 
appropriate rate. 6 
Exemptions might be structured as follows: the 
first $40,000 worth ($10,000 in assessed value) of a 
taxpayer's owner-occupied home, plus the first 
$40,000 worth of owner-operated farm or business 
property, plus the first 1,000 ac~es of owner-operated 
farmland covered by the Williamson Act, plus an 
equivalent value for each rental unit owned, would be 
excluded in computing the land gain. In addition, the 
first $1,000 in gain would be exempt. Californians 
who owned no property (or only owner-occupied 
homes worth less than $40,000) would not even have 
to file a land gains schedule. Over 95 percent of 
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households would thus be spared direct contact with 
the tax, while the rental exemption would avoid a 
shifting of its burden onto tenants. 
The revenue potential of a land gains tax would be 
considerable. Consider the following data. Land in 
California is now worth about $95 billion, and has 
been rising in value at about 8 percent per year. That 
creates an initial tax base of about $7.5 billion. 
Approximately half of that would be excluded under 
the residential, small farm, and small bushtess 
exemptions. That leaves about $3.7 billion that could 
be subject to uniform, progressive, or differential tax 
rates. A flat 10 percent rate would yield $370 million 
annually; a 15 percent rate would yield $555 million. 
A differentially higher rate for increases of value in 
property that had been rezoned for higher use would 
bring in added revenue.7 , 
Besides raising money to buy back the land, an 
annual land gains tax would, by itself, have several 
desirable consequences. By diminishing the tax 
advantages of investing in land, it would encourage 
the wealthy to put their money elsewhere, and 
perhaps prompt present large owners of land to begin 
selling. This would create a downward impact on land 
prices-downward enough (if the tax rate were 
reasonable) to slow the. natural rate of increase but 
riot to depress land values below their current level. 
To some extent this downward pressure would 
diminish the revenues raised by the tax, but it would 
also make buying land cheaper for CLCF recipients. 
Another consequence of a land gains tax would be 
the creation of jobs and housing; This would occur 
because the tax would fall only on the rise in land 
values, not on . improvements. Since the supply of 
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land doesn't diminish, a tax on land gains does not 
discourage productive investment. In fact, it en-
courages construction of income-producing improve-
ments on land, especially in the central city and on 
the urban fringe. Because of the exemption for low 
and middle-income homes and rental units, the 
greatest incentive would be to build low and 
middle~income housing, as opposed to luxury high· 
rises, shopping centers, and office buildings. If a 
differentially high rate were applied to land rezoned 
for higher use, the incentive would be to construct 
new housing in areas already zoned for it, rather than 
to sprawl into still-unspoiled areas. If the housing 
were built by low-income co-ops· or CDCs that 
received land acquisition funds through the CLCF, 
total costs could be cut by as much as 25 or 30 
percent. 
Three objections to the land gains tax might be 
that (I) it does not allow for appreciation attribut-
able to inflation; (2) it taxes unrealized gains; and (3) 
it constitutes double taxation, since gains would be 
taxed by the CLCF while accruing, then again by the 
state and federal governments when realized. These 
objections are readily answered. (I) No correctios for 
inflation is allowed in taxing inflation-induced in-
creases in wages, dividends, interest, or ordinary 
capital gains, and there is no reason that landowners 
should be entitled to special treatment. (2) Concern 
with taxing unrealized gains might be valid if low and 
middle-income homeowners and small businesses 
were not exempt from the tax. Any large landowner 
who did not have sufficient cash to pay the land gains 
tax could easily sell a portion of his holdings without 
hardship. In any case, the ordinary ad valorem 
property tax, which constitutes a heavier burden than 
would a land gains tax, is worse than an_ ul\realized 
gains tax because it taxes property values annually 
even when gains are not accrued. (3) The double tax 
argument is unconvincing because the "double tax" is 
no more than a higher rate of taxation on capital 
gains, a rate that in toto would still not equal the rate 
of taxation on wages (barring significant reform of 
the federal tax code). Moreover, taxes paid to the 
CLCF would be deductible from federal income 
taxes. 
Allocating the Land 
Assuming the CLCF generated annual revenues of 
$500 million to $700 million (which could be 
increased further by giving it bonding authority), it 
could finance the outright p~ch~e of several 
hundred thousand acres per year. Who would get the 
money to buy land, and how would allocations be 
made? 
The law establishing the CLCF would contain a 
formula for allocating funds by purpose, type of 
recipient, and location. Thus, 50 percent of the 
revenues might be allocated for open space acquisi-
tion. These funds would be divided among state 
agencies, cities, towns, counties, and regional park 
districts in accordance with population density, 
quality and quantity of open space available, and 
other factors. Some funds would be used for 
preserving wilderness and wildlife refuges, some for 
recreational areas, some for urban parks and suburban 
greenbelts (in which land might be leased back to 
small farmers and co-ops). Grants from the CLCF 
could cover up to 100 percent of land acquisition 
costs. 
The .remaining 50 percent of CLCF revenues 
would be divided among the following types of 
recipients: 
• Cooperatives of low-income families, for the 
acquisition of land for agriculture, related enter-
prises, and housing-for example, farmworkers 
might wish to buy out a corporate farm and run it 
cooperatively; 
• Community development corporations in rural and 
urban areas, for the acquisition of land for housing 
and nonpolluting industries-for example, a chain 
of CDCs might buy back the west side of the San 
Joaquin Valley, now almost wholly owned by a 
handful of absentee corporations; 
• Public utility districts, for the acquisition of land, 
water, or energy resources-for example, a district 
in the Imperial Valley might acquire geothermal 
energy sites; 
• Nonprofit land trusts, similar to the Jewish 
National Fund in Israel, for the acquisition of land 
for lease to family farmers and rural cooperatives, 
or of common land for Indian tribes and Mexican-
American communities (ejidos). 
As with open space funds, grants to private r,ecipients 
could cover up to 100 percent of land costs. 
Recipients would thus be free of debt burden on their 
land, and could use their land as collateral to borrow 
money for farm equipment, housing supplies, and 
other capital outlays. The debt-free gift of land would 
be in the tradition of the Homestead Act. It would, 
of course, be a subsidy, but one that would barely 
match the subsidies and tax breaks given to railroads, ,_ 
cattle barons, timber companies, energy corporations,. 
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wealthy tax-loss farmers, real estate developers, 
defense contractors and the like. 
Grants by the CLCF to private recipients would be 
subject to a number of restrictions and conditions. 
First, carefully drafted language in the law would 
assure that recipient corporations, cooperatives, and 
land trusts would either be genuinely nonprofit or 
owned in major part by persons of low or moderate 
income who lived and worked in or near the 
enterprises involved. (In other words, the Irvine 
Foundation, the Southern Pacific in its various guises, 
et al., would be ineligible to receive grants.) Second, 
nonprofit trusts receiving grants would be permitted 
to lease only to resi4ent family farmers and coopera-
tives. In no event could a trust lease farmland to an 
absentee operator, nor could it lease more than 320 
acres of irrigated farmland, or 1 ,000 acres of 
unirrigated farmland, to the same family, or double 
that amount to the same cooperative. In leasing 
farmland the trust would give preference to people 
with farm work experience and low incomes. Viola-
tion of any of these conditions would be cause for 
revocation of all grants, with grant money repayable 
(with interest plus a penalty) to the CLCF. Co-ops 
and CDCs would be subject to similar restrictions. 
Third, all recipients would be barred from resale of 
CLCF-funded land for at least 15 years. After that 
time the CLCF would retain first option to purchase 
at a price not greater than its iriitial grant. 
A particular danger stemming from CLCF grants is 
that valuable pieces of land (e.g., in the Santa Monica 
Mountains) would rapidly rise in price once it was 
known that funds were available to buy them. This 
might result in windfall profits for a few landowners, 
as has happened in many public park and urban 
renewal projects. The problem is probably not as 
acute as it might seem. The land gains tax would 
recapture at least a portion of any unearned 
windfalls, while exerting a downward pressure on 
land prices generally. Where publicly designated open 
space areas were involved, legislation could be 
adopted that would fix payment at full market value 
as of the date of designation. (Language to this effect 
was contained in the recent Redwood National Park 
Act.) With regard to land· sought for its economic 
rather than its scenic potential, there would be 
enough of it on the market to prevent price-gouging 
by owners of more valuable parcels. Pressure to 
enforce the 160-acre limitation and residency require-
ment in federal irrigation areas could help hold down 
prices in the Central and Imperial valleys. 
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Prospects and Problems 
What would happen if something like the CLCF were 
adopted today? Would co-ops, CDCs, and nonprofit 
land trusts be able to handle half a million acres if 
they received them, free of debt burden, next week 
or next year? Sadly, I suspect that the answer is no. 
There is an immediate, desperate need to improve the 
management capabilities of community and coopera· 
tively owned enterprises, and to increase the readiness 
of low-income families to participate meaningfully in 
such undertakings. Government,, university, founda· 
tion, and other private resources should be poured 
into this task. 
Politically, however, I think we are much further 
along than many people realize. Voters in California, 
their sensitivities heightened by smog, sprawl, and 
environmental activism, approved a statewide coastal 
zoning initiative last year as· well as numerous local 
open space bond issues. (School bond issues, mean· 
while, were generally going down to defeat.) In the 
legislature, a bill to create an open space trust fund 
fmanced by a transaction tax on land value incre-
ments has been introduced by Assemblyman John 
Dunlap and co-sponsored by Speaker Bob Moretti. 
The California Tomorrow plan, supported by a 
cross-section of business and political leaders, en-
visions a substantial amount of public land owner· 
ship. In other parts of the country, interest in open 
space preservation and land reform of a conservative 
sort has been growing. The Republican county 
executive of Suffolk County, New York, recently 
proposed that the county buy up farmland threat· 
ened with subdivision and lease it back to the farmers 
who are using it. A 1972 report financed by Laurance 
Rockefeller recommended creation of "public corpor· 
ations" to acquire land for new town development. 
Robert Wood, former secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development and now president of the University of 
Massachusetts, has said that "public ownership and 
public planning are probably the essential compo· 
nents for a genuine land reform program." 
Many if not most of these "land reformers" see 
public land ownership as beneficial primarily to 
profit-seeking new town developers, bankers, and 
well-to-do farmers, rather than low-income groups, as 
Geoffrey Faux points out.8 In my view, public land 
ownership is not a very promising device for helping 
poor people, although it's fine for open space 
preservation. Helping the poor requires that they have 
more direct access to the land than public ownership 
per se has provided or can provide. The point, 
however, is that people are ready, or almost ready, to 
accept the notion of buying back sizable quantities of 
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land from its present owners. The political task is to 
make sure that "buy back the land" programs are not 
used solely for parks and commercial developers, but 
are also designed to benefit low-income and com· 
munity groups. 
What is necessary over the next few years, it seems 
to me, is a two-front strategy. On the political front, 
we must deal with the fact that voters are prepared to 
spend public money to purchase land for migratory 
birds, but not yet prepared to do the same for 
migratory workers. While lamenting and fighting this 
reality we might as well take advantage of it; there are 
no other sources of large-scale money for community 
economic development on the horizon. 
I said earlier that a land transfer mechanism such 
as the CLCF would be politically salable, especially as 
a ballot initiative. I believe it would be salable 
be~ause it could be supported by a coalition of 
low-income minority groups, middle and upper· 
income people interested in parks and open space, 
and labor. Its appeal would lie in the fact that it 
would preserve and create jobs and protect the 
environment-all without adding a single penny to the 
sales tax, property tax, or income tax on wages. 
The second front involves developing the psycho· 
logical and managerial capabilities necessary for 
running new economic structures such as coopera· 
tives, CDCs, and land trusts. This is a much more 
difficult front than the political one, and a persistent 
problem over the next. few years will be that of 
timing-how to develop social structures fast enough 
to keep up with the political gains I believe are 
possible. 
It would be wrong to conclude on too optimistic a 
note. The forces opposed to genuine land reform are 
powerful-in Sacramento, in Washington, and in the 
marketplace. If locally owned economic institutions 
are to survive, much less to flourish, there must be 
more than a redistribution of land. There must also 
be far-reaching changes in federal tax, subsidy, and 
anti-trust policies. Such. changes will be extremely 
difficult to bring about. It can only be said at this 
time that the possibilities are there. It is up to us to· 
work strenuously for their attainment. 
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farm acreage but used 84 percent of the pesticides. 
2. See, for example, Carey McWilliams, Factories in the 
Field (Boston: Little, Brown, 1939); Peter Barnes, "The 
Great American Land Grab," New Republic, June 4, 
1971; and the Ralph Nader Task Force Report Politics 
of Land (New York: Grossman, 1973). 
3. California is not unique in its concentrated land 
ownership; the same pattern prevails in other parts of the 
country. For example, a 1970 study of 14 coal-
producing counties in West Virginia found that the top 
25 landowners owned or controlled over 50 percent of 
the land in the majority of those counties. The 7 largest 
landowners in the 14-county region were all out-of-state 
corporations: Pocahontas Land (a subsidiary of the 
Norfolk and Western railroad), Consolidation Coal (a 
subsidiary of Continental Oil), the C&O/B&O railroad, 
Georgia-Pacific, Eastern Associated Coal, Island Creek 
Coal (a subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum), and · 
Bethlehem Steel. Note that 2 of the 7-Georgia-Pacific 
and Occidental Petroleum-are also among the top 10 
landowners in California. For a more complete discus-
sion of land ownership patterns nationally, see Peter 
Barnes and Larry Casalino, "Who Owns the Land?'' Clear 
Creek, December 1972, available as a reprint from the 
Center for Rural Studies, 345 Franklin Street, San 
Francisco, California 94102. 
4. Davis interviewed by the author. Maltzman quoted by 
Art Detman, Jr., "Lessons from the National Housing 
Act," Saturday Review of the Society, April 1973. An 
analysis of the way rising land values inflate the cost of 
privately developed housing can be found in Edward 
Kirshner and James Morey, "Controlling a City's 
Wealth," Working Papers, Spring 1973. The two housing 
experts calculate that if land were owned by residents of 
a new community rather than by a profit-seeking 
developer, the cost of new housing could be cut by 23 
percent. 
5. Additional revenues for the CLCF might be raised 
through an excise tax on campers, snowmobiles, motor-
boats, and other recreational equipment, on the theory 
that purchasers of such equipment are likely to be 
priinary users of recreational land acquired by the CLCF. 
Similarly, state park entrance fees and concessions 
rentals could be channeled into the fund. These revenue 
sources would be considerably more regressive, however, 
than would the severance and unearned increment taxes. 
6. Since not all property in California is reassessed every 
year, a landowner who had not been reassessed migftt 
show a zero or negative increment. If this happened he 
would not incur a land gain tax liability for that year. In 
a year or two, when reassessment did occur, he might 
show a substantial land value increment. He would then 
have the option of spreading payment out over a 
three-year period in a manner somewhat analogous to 
income averaging. 
7. The question of what might be an optimum rate 
schedule would need to be studied carefully. Theoreti-
cally, a rate of about 70 percent would be justifiable 
since, when coupled with state and federal capital gains 
taxes, a 70 percent tax would fully capture for society 
what society itself had created. A 22 percent rate would 
be the equivalent of closing the capital gains loophole 
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with respect to land. This can be seen by considering the 
example of a land speculator in the 50 percent tax 
bracket. He buys a piece of land for $1,000 and sells it 
for $1,200, producing a capital gain of $200. He pays a 
federal capital gains tax of $50 (half of 50 percent of 
$200), and a state capital gains tax of about $5. With a 
22 percent land gains tax he would pay an additional 
$44 to the CLCF, bringing his total tax to $99, or nearly 
50 percent of his capital gain-the same rate that a 
wage-earner in his tax bracket would pay. 
In determining the optimum rate level in California 
or any other state, it would be extremely important to 
evaluate the effect of the tax on land prices. Any tax on 
land value increments would automatically slow down 
the increase in land values. If the tax rate were too high, 
land values might actually decline, thereby wiping out, 
among other things, the revenue base of the tax. 
Whatever the rate structure chosen, it would probably be 
advisable to phase the tax in gradually. 
, 8. See "Reclaiming America" in this issue. 
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